ralph-loop

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 24, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates an indirect prompt injection surface by design. It implements an autonomous loop that re-injects the content of a project-level file (PROMPT.md) into the agent's context during each iteration.
  • Ingestion points: Reads from .claude/ralph/PROMPT.md (template in templates/implementation-template.md).
  • Boundary markers: None explicitly implemented in the provided management scripts; the skill relies on the agent to interpret the re-injected JSON decision.
  • Capability inventory: The skill is configured with powerful tools including Bash, Write, and Edit, which could be exploited if the loop is compromised.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the content being re-injected into the prompt.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's architecture relies on the execution of local shell scripts and Node.js hooks to manage the loop lifecycle.
  • Evidence: The implementation template in templates/implementation-template.md suggests using a launcher script (ralph-audit.sh) and a stop hook (ralph-stop-hook.cjs) that the agent interacts with.
  • Context: While these are standard for the skill's orchestration purpose, the autonomous nature of the execution loop increases the potential impact of any command injection or unintended tool use.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The hooks/post-execute.cjs script attempts to execute a local observability tool located at a relative path outside the skill's own directory structure.
  • Evidence: require(path.resolve(__dirname, '../../../../tools/observability/send-event.cjs')).
  • Context: This is a vendor-internal resource for event tracking and does not escalate the verdict, but represents an external execution dependency.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 24, 2026, 06:13 PM