slack-notifications

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 6, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The file commands/slack-notifications.md includes the directive 'follow it exactly as presented to you', which is a prompt injection attempt designed to bypass standard operational constraints and prioritize the skill's specific instructions.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The SKILL.md file mandates a 'Memory Protocol' that forces the agent to read from and write to specific local files (learnings.md, issues.md, decisions.md) to maintain behavioral state. This serves as an instruction-driven persistence mechanism that could be used to manipulate future agent interactions.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill provides an upload-file tool that enables the agent to send local filesystem data to external Slack channels. This capability, combined with example commands targeting specific paths like 'C:\reports\weekly.pdf', represents a significant data exfiltration risk if the agent is misled by malicious input.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a significant surface for indirect prompt injection:
  • Ingestion points: Tools such as channel-history and list-files retrieve untrusted content from external Slack workspaces into the agent's active context (documented in SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: There are no defined delimiters or safety instructions provided to help the agent distinguish between its own system instructions and potentially malicious commands embedded within the retrieved Slack data.
  • Capability inventory: The agent is granted high-privilege capabilities including file uploads (upload-file), message broadcasting (post-message), and general shell access (Bash), which could be triggered by instructions found in Slack messages.
  • Sanitization: The skill lacks any mechanism to sanitize or validate data fetched from Slack before it is presented to the agent's reasoning engine.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 6, 2026, 09:09 AM