template-renderer

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 3, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill acts as a surface for indirect prompt injection because it interpolates user-controlled token values into documents that the agent may later read as context.\n
  • Ingestion points: The tokens argument passed to scripts/main.cjs, either as a JSON string or from an external file.\n
  • Boundary markers: The rendered output does not use delimiters or provide explicit instructions for the agent to isolate the substituted token values from the surrounding template structure.\n
  • Capability inventory: The skill uses fs.writeFileSync to write the rendered templates to the local filesystem.\n
  • Sanitization: The script implements a sanitizeTokenValue function that strips characters used for HTML injection and template literal breakouts (<, >, ${, {{), which provides protection against technical injection but does not filter natural language instructions or adversarial text.\n- [SAFE]: The skill correctly implements path traversal protections in validateTemplatePath, ensuring that template files are only read from the authorized .claude/templates/ directory.\n- [SAFE]: The use of a strict token whitelist for each template type effectively limits the potential for unexpected data fields to be processed.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 3, 2026, 02:05 PM