workflow-updater

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 8, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes dynamically generated scripts using node -e in Step 6 of SKILL.md. This process involves interpolating ${AGENT_NAME} (sourced from the workflow being updated) directly into the script, which may lead to command injection if the input workflow contains malicious naming patterns.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Performs dynamic loading of a local library using require('.claude/lib/creators/companion-check.cjs') in Step 3. While this is a local path, the use of dynamic execution for logic validation is a notable behavior.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches research data from arxiv.org and performs web searches via the Exa platform. These are well-known research services used to align workflows with current industry standards.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Accesses internal configuration and metadata files, such as agent-registry.json, skill-catalog.md, and project memory files (learnings.md, decisions.md, issues.md). This access is legitimate for the skill's purpose of ecosystem alignment but represents a data exposure surface.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from external research, creating an indirect prompt injection surface.
  • Ingestion points: External content is retrieved via WebFetch (targeting arxiv.org) and WebSearch (via Exa) in Step 2 of SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: Includes a mandatory 'Security Review Gate' that checks for tool invocations and instruction-like patterns in fetched prose.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes high-privilege tools including Bash, Write, Edit, WebFetch, and Skill execution.
  • Sanitization: Implements specific scans for size, binary content, tool usage, and prompt injection markers before utilizing external data.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 8, 2026, 04:01 PM