baoyu-format-markdown
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 27, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/autocorrect.tsfile usesexecSyncto runnpx autocorrect-nodewhile passing thefilePathvariable directly into the shell command string. Although wrapped in double quotes, this pattern is vulnerable to command injection if the file path contains shell metacharacters like backticks or subshell expansion markers. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill relies on
npxto fetch and executeautocorrect-nodeandbunat runtime. These downloads from the public npm registry occur dynamically during the execution of the skill's workflow. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements an indirect prompt injection surface by reading and analyzing the content of user-provided files (Step 2 and Step 3). Malicious instructions embedded within a markdown or text file could potentially trick the agent into ignoring its formatting rules or revealing its system prompt during the analysis phase.
- Ingestion points: Reads arbitrary markdown or plain text files via the main workflow.
- Boundary markers: None identified in the prompt interpolation logic to isolate the untrusted file content.
- Capability inventory: File system read/write, shell command execution via npx, and structured markdown parsing.
- Sanitization: Uses structured parsing with
unifiedandremark, but the high-level analysis (titles/summaries) relies on the LLM's direct processing of the text.
Audit Metadata