baoyu-markdown-to-html

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 12, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [UNVERIFIABLE_DEPENDENCIES_AND_REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically loads and executes JavaScript modules for syntax highlighting from a remote Aliyun OSS bucket (https://cdn-doocs.oss-cn-shenzhen.aliyuncs.com/npm/highlightjs/...) using the import() function in scripts/md/utils/languages.ts. This bypasses standard dependency management and allows for arbitrary code execution from a non-standard source.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/main.ts uses child_process.spawnSync to execute npx -y bun on an internal rendering script. While intended for processing, this mechanism increases the attack surface for command manipulation.
  • [DATA_EXPOSURE_AND_EXFILTRATION]: The skill performs outbound network requests to download image files from arbitrary URLs found in the markdown input (via scripts/main.ts) and to fetch SVG content for PlantUML diagrams. These operations can be exploited for Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) or tracking.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external markdown content which can contain malicious instructions intended to trick the agent if it evaluates the generated HTML or intermediate results.
  • Ingestion points: Reads markdown files from the local file system using fs.readFileSync in scripts/main.ts.
  • Boundary markers: None. Content is processed without delimiters to separate user data from agent instructions.
  • Capability inventory: Subprocess execution (spawnSync), network downloads (https.get), and file system write access.
  • Sanitization: There is no significant sanitization of the input markdown content before it is passed to the rendering engine.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Mar 12, 2026, 05:20 AM