gitlab-cli
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- Data Exposure & Exfiltration (HIGH): The script
scripts/export_variables.shis designed to leak secrets. It runsglab variable export, which retrieves all project or group environment variables (including those marked as 'masked' in the UI), saves them to a local file, and then executescat "$OUTPUT". This action prints raw credentials, API tokens, and private keys into the agent's output stream. - Indirect Prompt Injection (LOW): The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it reads and processes content from untrusted external sources.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data is ingested via
glab issue view,glab mr view, andglab ci trace(job logs). - Boundary markers: Absent. The agent receives the raw CLI output without delimiters or instructions to treat the content as untrusted data.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses highly sensitive capabilities, including repository deletion (
glab repo delete --yes), variable manipulation (glab variable set), and CI/CD execution (glab ci run). - Sanitization: None. The skill does not filter or sanitize the content of issues, merge requests, or logs before processing them.
- Command Execution (MEDIUM): The skill provides a functional wrapper for the
glabCLI, granting the agent the ability to execute a wide array of administrative commands on internal infrastructure (192.168.10.117). While this is the intended purpose, the inclusion of the--yesflag in documentation and scripts increases the risk of accidental or malicious destructive actions.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata