skill-installer

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS (HIGH): The skill facilitates downloading code from GitHub. While it defaults to a trusted organization, it explicitly supports arbitrary repositories and private repos via the --repo and --url arguments, as described in SKILL.md.
  • REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION (HIGH): The skill's core purpose is to download executable code and place it into the agent's execution directory ($CODEX_HOME/skills). The documentation in SKILL.md instructs the user to restart the agent to 'pick up new skills', which results in the execution of the downloaded content.
  • COMMAND_EXECUTION (MEDIUM): The skill documentation suggests overwriting system-level skills (.system) if a user 'insists', which could lead to tampering with the core agent's behavior.
  • CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE (LOW): In scripts/github_utils.py, the skill accesses GITHUB_TOKEN or GH_TOKEN from the environment. While currently only sent to api.github.com (a whitelisted domain), the exposure of this token to newly installed (and potentially malicious) skills is a significant risk.
  • INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION (MEDIUM): The script scripts/list-skills.py ingests untrusted data from the GitHub API.
  • Ingestion points: Fetches directory contents from GitHub repositories via the API contents endpoint.
  • Boundary markers: None; external data (file names) is directly incorporated into the agent's response list.
  • Capability inventory: Writing to the filesystem and installing code that will be executed upon restart.
  • Sanitization: None; file names and paths are processed as-is from the API response.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 12:38 PM