azure-auth
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 13, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): The skill processes untrusted external data (project files and metadata) to generate security-sensitive authentication and middleware code.
- Ingestion points: Step 1 gathers Azure AD configuration and reads
package.json; Step 2 loadsproject_overview.mdandcommon_patterns.mdfrom the project's memory. - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not define delimiters to isolate external project content from the agent's logic.
- Capability inventory: The skill generates executable authentication code (MSAL configuration, JWT validation logic) and has file-write permissions (Step 5 saves files to
/claudedocs/). - Sanitization: Absent. There is no specified validation or escaping for the project-sourced data before it is interpolated into code templates.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (LOW): The skill references the
joseandmsallibraries and fetches public keys from Microsoft's JWKS endpoint. - Evidence: Step 4d specifies downloading keys from
https://login.microsoftonline.com/{tenantId}/discovery/v2.0/keys. - Trust Scope: These are trusted sources (Microsoft and standard OIDC discovery), downgrading the download risk to LOW.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata