skills/olino3/forge/docs-workflow/Gen Agent Trust Hub

docs-workflow

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill ingests untrusted data from the project's codebase (Step 1, Step 4, and Step 5) and uses it to generate or modify critical project files like CLAUDE.md and README.md.
  • Ingestion points: The skill scans all project files, including source code, configuration, and existing documentation, to identify 'changes', 'conventions', and 'architecture'.
  • Boundary markers: No boundary markers or instruction-isolation techniques are mentioned in the workflow when interpolating project data into templates.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has write access to the filesystem, specifically targeting files that dictate agent behavior (CLAUDE.md) and project instructions.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the content read from the project files.
  • Risk: An attacker could place malicious instructions in code comments or metadata. These instructions could be promoted into CLAUDE.md, which subsequent agents or tools will use to execute build/test commands, leading to persistent prompt injection or unauthorized command execution.
  • Data Exposure (HIGH): The skill intentionally identifies and documents project secrets and environment variables.
  • Evidence: Example 2 explicitly demonstrates the skill detecting an AUTH_SECRET and adding it to CLAUDE.md and README.md.
  • Risk: If the agent accesses active environment variables or .env files and writes their values into the documentation reports or project files, it constitutes a critical exposure of credentials (CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE).
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 09:08 AM