docx
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 28, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Runtime compilation and process injection logic in 'scripts/office/soffice.py'.
- Compiles an embedded C source ('lo_socket_shim.c') using 'gcc' into a shared library at runtime.
- Uses the 'LD_PRELOAD' environment variable to inject the compiled library into the 'soffice' subprocess to shim AF_UNIX socket calls.
- Executes system binaries including 'gcc', 'soffice', 'git', 'pandoc', and 'pdftoppm' across multiple scripts ('soffice.py', 'accept_changes.py', 'redlining.py').
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: 'SKILL.md' directs the installation of the 'docx' package from the global NPM registry. This reference to a well-known official registry is documented neutrally.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Indirect prompt injection attack surface identified due to processing untrusted external files.
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- Ingestion points: The skill reads and extracts content from potentially untrusted '.docx', '.pptx', and '.xlsx' files via 'scripts/office/unpack.py' and 'pandoc'.
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- Boundary markers: Absent; there are no explicit delimiters or instructions to the agent to ignore embedded instructions within the ingested document content.
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- Capability inventory: Extensive system capabilities including arbitrary file system access ('Path.rglob', 'shutil.copy2'), command execution ('subprocess.run'), and runtime compilation of C code.
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- Sanitization: Uses 'defusedxml' for XML parsing to mitigate XML External Entity (XXE) risks, but does not provide sanitization for text content against malicious instructions interpolated into the agent context.
Audit Metadata