onlyfansapi-skill
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill contains a dangerous execution flow where it instructs the agent to 'fetch the LLM documentation first' from a remote URL (
https://docs.onlyfansapi.com/llms-full.txt) and use that content to determine how to interact with the API. - Ingestion points:
SKILL.mdworkflow step 1:curl -s "https://docs.onlyfansapi.com/llms-full.txt" | head -n 500. - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not provide any delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore potential commands embedded in this remote documentation.
- Capability inventory: The agent has
Bash(curl:*)andBash(jq:*)permissions, allowing it to perform various network operations and process data. - Sanitization: Absent. Content is piped directly to the agent's reasoning context.
- Command Execution (MEDIUM): The skill utilizes broad
Bash(curl:*)permissions. While intended for theonlyfansapi.comdomain, the wildcard pattern allows the agent to potentially execute curl commands against any domain if influenced by the aforementioned Indirect Prompt Injection or malicious user input. - Credential Handling (INFO): The skill requires a highly sensitive
ONLYFANSAPI_API_KEYwhich grants access to financial data, earnings statements, and model information. While using environment variables is a standard practice, the high value of this credential increases the impact of any successful injection or exfiltration attack.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata