adobe-automator
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: CRITICALREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION] (CRITICAL): The
runScriptcommand inhandler.jsaccepts a rawscriptstring from the agent/user, writes it to a temporary.jsxfile, and then triggers its execution via system bridges. This effectively allows the execution of arbitrary code on the host machine. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (HIGH): The skill uses
child_process.spawnSyncto invokecscript(Windows) orosascript(macOS). While the command arguments themselves are mostly static, they are used to facilitate the execution of the dynamic JSX payload. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION] (HIGH): The Adobe ExtendScript engine includes powerful
FileandFolderobjects. Any script passed to this skill can access sensitive locations like~/.ssh/,~/.aws/credentials, or browser cookies and potentially exfiltrate them via ExtendScript's socket or HTTP capabilities (depending on the specific Adobe app version). - [INDIRECT PROMPT INJECTION] (HIGH): This skill is highly susceptible to indirect injection. If an agent is asked to 'Summarize this file and then run a script based on it,' an attacker can embed malicious JSX in the source file that the agent will then pass to the
runScriptcommand without realizing the danger. - [DYNAMIC EXECUTION] (CRITICAL): The core logic in
handler.js(lines 80-92) implements a classic 'write-then-execute' pattern for untrusted code, which is the primary vector for system compromise in AI agent environments.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata