agent-passport
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill installs and executes the
agent-passport-systemandagent-passport-system-mcppackages from the NPM registry. These are vendor-owned resources necessary for the skill's functionality. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Agent metadata—including name, public key, owner, and capabilities—is transmitted to a remote public registry at
aeoess.com/agoraduring the registration process. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill generates and stores Ed25519 private keys locally in
.passport/agent.json. Additionally, the documentation notes that theregister_agora_publictool requires aGITHUB_TOKENto function. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on
npxto run CLI commands such asagent-passport joinandagent-passport registerfor local environment setup and remote interaction. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an indirect prompt injection surface as it is designed to read and process external data from a public source.
- Ingestion points: The
get_agora_messages,get_agora_thread, andget_agora_by_topictools retrieve untrusted messages from the public Agora registry. - Boundary markers: There are no documented delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the retrieved Agora messages.
- Capability inventory: The skill allows the agent to write files, execute CLI commands via
npx, and perform network operations. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or content validation is mentioned for the messages retrieved from the remote registry.
Audit Metadata