skills/openclaw/skills/agent-protocol/Gen Agent Trust Hub

agent-protocol

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 18, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): The subscribe.py script executes arbitrary local scripts as event handlers via subprocess.run. While this facilitates the skill's primary function as an orchestration engine, it establishes a high-risk capability that could be abused if the configuration files or handler scripts are compromised.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION] (LOW): The architecture relies on variable substitution ({{payload.field}}) to pass event data to other agents, creating a surface for Indirect Prompt Injection. \n
  • Ingestion points: Event queue files at ~/.clawdbot/events/queue/*.json.\n
  • Boundary markers: Absent; the system uses direct template interpolation.\n
  • Capability inventory: Subprocess execution of handlers and agents.\n
  • Sanitization: None; payloads are used raw without escaping or validation.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION] (SAFE): No hardcoded credentials, sensitive file access outside of the skill's own data directory, or unauthorized network activity was detected in the provided code.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Feb 18, 2026, 01:14 PM