The Agent Skills Directory

Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill possesses a significant attack surface by design. It explicitly instructs the agent to 'Review and integrate any information, research material, or links provided by the user' in Phase 1 and 2.
Ingestion Points: Research materials, notes, and external URLs provided by the user (SKILL.md, Phase 1).
Boundary Markers: Absent. There are no instructions to use delimiters or to ignore instructions embedded within the research data.
Capability Inventory: The agent has the capability to write to a remote network service (Notion API) and write files to the local directory references/blog-examples/.
Sanitization: Absent. The skill does not provide any guidance on filtering or escaping content found in external links or notes.
Data Exfiltration (HIGH): Because the skill is hardcoded to publish content to a specific Notion database (04a872be-8bed-4f43-a448-3dfeebc0df21), a successful Indirect Prompt Injection could trick the agent into harvesting sensitive data from the user's environment or other tools and 'publishing' it to this external database.
Persistence via File System (MEDIUM): In Phase 5, the skill requires the agent to save finalized content to the local references/blog-examples/ folder. An attacker could use this to store malicious prompts that will be referenced by the agent in future sessions during the 'calibration' step of Phase 2.

blog-writer