codex-cli
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 22, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- COMMAND_EXECUTION (HIGH): The skill promotes the use of the --full-auto and --yolo flags, as well as the danger-full-access sandbox mode. These configurations explicitly disable security approvals and sandboxing, allowing the CLI tool to execute arbitrary commands and modify any file on the host system without user intervention.
- EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS (HIGH): The skill instructs the user to run npm i -g @openai/codex. This package name appears to be impersonating OpenAI, as no such official CLI tool currently exists with that name, and the referenced model versions (GPT-5, GPT-5.2) are fictional. Installing unverified global packages provides them with high-level persistence and execution capabilities.
- CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE (MEDIUM): The documentation encourages users to pipe their OPENAI_API_KEY directly into the CLI tool (printenv OPENAI_API_KEY | codex login --with-api-key). This pattern can lead to credential exposure in shell history or process logs.
- REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION (HIGH): Through the Pattern 5: MCP Server Mode, the skill allows the CLI tool to act as a Model Context Protocol server. This enables remote execution of tools and commands defined by the unverified CLI package.
- INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION (LOW): The skill creates a large attack surface for indirect prompt injection. 1. Ingestion points: Processes entire codebases, PR diffs, and images provided via --cd, --add-dir, and --image flags in SKILL.md and clawdbot-integration.md. 2. Boundary markers: Absent. 3. Capability inventory: Full filesystem read/write (read, write, edit, apply_patch) and command execution (exec, process) across all integration files. 4. Sanitization: Absent.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata