google-calendar

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 19, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [Metadata Poisoning] (MEDIUM): There is a deceptive discrepancy between the skill documentation in SKILL.md and the actual implementation. The documentation claims the skill uses the google-api-python-client library and the build() function for API interaction, whereas the scripts scripts/google_calendar.py and scripts/refresh_token.py actually use urllib.request to manually perform REST calls. This misleading metadata can cause misjudgment of the skill's dependencies and internal behavior.
  • [Indirect Prompt Injection] (LOW): The skill possesses a surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting untrusted data from an external API.
  • Ingestion points: scripts/google_calendar.py (via the list_events function which retrieves event summaries and descriptions).
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not provide any delimiters or instructions to help the agent distinguish between calendar data and system instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can perform authenticated HTTP requests (GET, POST, PUT, DELETE) and has file-write access to ~/.config/google-calendar/secrets.env.
  • Sanitization: Absent. While IDs are URL-encoded for API safety, the textual content of the events is not sanitized or validated before being passed to the agent's context.
  • [External Downloads] (LOW): SKILL.md instructs users to install several Google-owned Python packages. Although these are from trusted sources, they are unnecessary as the provided code does not utilize them, contributing to the metadata discrepancy.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Feb 19, 2026, 09:36 PM