memory-manager
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 4, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Path traversal vulnerability in
categorize.sh. The script utilizes user-provided arguments$NAMEand$SOURCEinmvandcatoperations without sanitization. An attacker can use traversal sequences (e.g.,../../) to target files outside the intended memory directory, potentially overwriting critical system files like~/.bashrcor~/.ssh/authorized_keys.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Argument injection vulnerability insearch.sh. The script passes the unsanitized$QUERYvariable directly to thegrepcommand. This allows an attacker to injectgrepflags such as-f, which can be used to read arbitrary files from the filesystem or manipulate search output to expose sensitive information.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection. It retrieves and processes content from markdown files stored in the workspace, which could contain malicious instructions designed to hijack the agent's behavior.\n - Ingestion points: Files within
memory/episodic/,memory/semantic/, andmemory/procedural/are read bysearch.shandsnapshot.sh.\n - Boundary markers: None. The scripts lack markers or instructions to the LLM to ignore potentially malicious embedded content.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to read, move, and overwrite files via standard shell utilities.\n
- Sanitization: There is no validation or filtering of content retrieved from the memory files before it is returned to the agent context.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata