skills/openclaw/skills/ontology/Gen Agent Trust Hub

ontology

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 18, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): The skill documentation encourages the agent to interact with a local script scripts/ontology.py using shell commands where JSON-formatted data is passed as arguments (e.g., python3 scripts/ontology.py create --props '...'). This pattern is highly susceptible to command injection if property values or query filters containing shell metacharacters are not rigorously escaped by the agent or the underlying script.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION] (LOW): The skill is vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8) as it is designed to ingest and retrieve untrusted data from multiple sources (notes, emails, project descriptions).
  • Ingestion points: Data enters the system via the create and update commands through entity properties like notes, description, and content (identified in SKILL.md and references/schema.md).
  • Boundary markers: The skill uses JSON structures as boundaries, but these are primarily for data integrity rather than security isolation against adversarial instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses file read/write capabilities for graph.jsonl and schema.yaml, and the ability to execute its own CLI tool.
  • Sanitization: While the schema reference (references/schema.md) defines validation rules for types and enums, there is no evidence of sanitization to prevent embedded instructions from influencing the agent's behavior during graph traversal or query results.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Feb 18, 2026, 08:45 AM