skills/openclaw/skills/opencode/Gen Agent Trust Hub

opencode

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 1, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs users to modify their shell configuration file (~/.zshrc) by appending a PATH export. Modifying shell profiles is a persistence mechanism that can be abused to execute arbitrary commands during session startup.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The installation guide (INSTALL.md) recommends using sudo for copying files and modifying system-level ownership/permissions. Recommending elevated privileges for skill installation increases the potential impact of any malicious components within the toolchain.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection due to its processing of untrusted external data.
  • Ingestion points: The opencode pr command fetches data from external GitHub Pull Requests, and the opencode run -f command reads the content of local files.
  • Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit delimiters or instructions to the AI agent to ignore potentially malicious instructions embedded within the ingested data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill provides access to opencode, an AI-native code editor with high-privilege capabilities including file modification, code execution, and starting a web server via opencode web.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, validation, or filtering of the external content before it is processed by the AI models.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 1, 2026, 01:52 PM