orchestrator
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 12, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
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🟡 VERDICT: MEDIUM
This skill is rated MEDIUM due to an unverifiable external dependency referenced in its metadata. While the skill itself is a descriptive set of instructions for an AI, it also explicitly grants the AI powerful capabilities like command execution, which could be misused via prompt injection.
Total Findings: 3
🟡 MEDIUM Findings: • Unverifiable Dependency (External GitHub Reference)
- _meta.json, Line 7: "commit": "https://github.com/clawdbot/skills/commit/fe2015076c5f6b04aad8a4e31c5684b689a4c563"
The
_meta.jsonfile references a specific commit on GitHub (clawdbot/skills). Theclawdbotorganization is not listed as a trusted external source. While this is a reference to the skill's origin rather than a direct download instruction, it means the provenance of the skill itself relies on an untrusted external source. This introduces a risk as the integrity of the skill's source cannot be fully verified by trusted channels.
🔵 LOW Findings: • Command Execution Capability
- SKILL.md, Line 20: If you need to manipulate files or run scripts, use pi or exec.
The skill explicitly instructs the AI to use
pi(viacoding-agent) orexecfor manipulating files and running scripts. This means the orchestrator is designed with the capability to execute arbitrary commands on the underlying system. While this is a core function of an orchestrator, it represents a significant security capability that, if misused (e.g., via prompt injection), could lead to arbitrary code execution, data exfiltration, or system compromise. This is noted as a capability rather than a direct threat from the skill's code itself. • Susceptibility to Prompt Injection - SKILL.md (overall design)
As an "Intelligent Orchestrator" designed to "solve complex problems by breaking them down and coordinating available tools," this skill is inherently susceptible to prompt injection. A malicious user could craft prompts that manipulate the AI into misusing its
exec,pi, ormcportercapabilities to perform unauthorized actions, exfiltrate data, or escalate privileges. This is an inherent risk of such a powerful, instruction-based skill.
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