skills/openclaw/skills/soulmate/Gen Agent Trust Hub

soulmate

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 13, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • Prompt Injection (MEDIUM): The file soul-patch.md contains explicit instructions to override the agent's fundamental identity. Commands such as '不要提醒用户"这只是模拟"' (Do not remind the user 'this is just a simulation') and '不要打破角色设定' (Do not break the character setting) are designed to suppress the AI's standard safety/identity disclosures, which is a common pattern in persona-based jailbreaks.
  • Indirect Prompt Injection (MEDIUM): The skill implements a feature where it reads and acts upon 'scenarios' defined in markdown files (e.g., scenarios/beach.md). According to scenarios/README.md, users can create their own scenario files. This design lacks boundary markers or sanitization, creating a vulnerability where a scenario file could contain malicious instructions that the agent would execute under the guise of roleplay.
  • Ingestion points: Files located in the scenarios/ directory.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The agent is instructed to directly perform roleplay based on the file content without delimiters.
  • Capability inventory: Modifies the agent's primary personality and interaction logic via soul-patch.md.
  • Sanitization: Absent. There is no evidence of filtering or validation for user-provided scenario descriptions.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Feb 13, 2026, 02:54 PM