telegram-bot-manager
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 14, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION] (HIGH): The skill facilitates the ingestion of untrusted data from the Telegram Bot API, creating a vulnerability to Indirect Prompt Injection.
- Ingestion points: Data enters through the
getUpdatescall inscripts/test_bot.pyand via the configured webhooks/polling mechanisms described inreferences/WEBHOOK_SETUP.md. - Boundary markers: No boundary markers or 'ignore embedded instructions' delimiters are implemented in the configuration templates or test scripts.
- Capability inventory: The skill enables the Telegram plugin for the OpenClaw gateway, which, as an agent platform, typically possesses high-privilege capabilities including file system access and tool execution.
- Sanitization: No evidence of message sanitization or instruction filtering is present in the provided scripts or documentation.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): The
scripts/setup_bot.pyscript automatically executes system-level commands usingsubprocess.runto restart the OpenClaw gateway. - Evidence:
subprocess.run(['openclaw', 'gateway', 'restart'], ...)inscripts/setup_bot.py(Line 160). - [DATA_EXPOSURE] (MEDIUM): The setup script modifies the primary system configuration file (
openclaw.json) and stores the user-provided Telegram Bot Token in plain text. - Evidence:
self.config_path = Path("/home/openclaw/.openclaw/openclaw.json")andjson.dump(config, f, indent=2)inscripts/setup_bot.py. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (LOW): Both
setup_bot.pyandtest_bot.pyinitiate outbound network requests to the Telegram API domain. - Evidence: Network requests to
https://api.telegram.orgusing therequestslibrary.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata