telegram-bot-manager

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 14, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION] (HIGH): The skill facilitates the ingestion of untrusted data from the Telegram Bot API, creating a vulnerability to Indirect Prompt Injection.
  • Ingestion points: Data enters through the getUpdates call in scripts/test_bot.py and via the configured webhooks/polling mechanisms described in references/WEBHOOK_SETUP.md.
  • Boundary markers: No boundary markers or 'ignore embedded instructions' delimiters are implemented in the configuration templates or test scripts.
  • Capability inventory: The skill enables the Telegram plugin for the OpenClaw gateway, which, as an agent platform, typically possesses high-privilege capabilities including file system access and tool execution.
  • Sanitization: No evidence of message sanitization or instruction filtering is present in the provided scripts or documentation.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): The scripts/setup_bot.py script automatically executes system-level commands using subprocess.run to restart the OpenClaw gateway.
  • Evidence: subprocess.run(['openclaw', 'gateway', 'restart'], ...) in scripts/setup_bot.py (Line 160).
  • [DATA_EXPOSURE] (MEDIUM): The setup script modifies the primary system configuration file (openclaw.json) and stores the user-provided Telegram Bot Token in plain text.
  • Evidence: self.config_path = Path("/home/openclaw/.openclaw/openclaw.json") and json.dump(config, f, indent=2) in scripts/setup_bot.py.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (LOW): Both setup_bot.py and test_bot.py initiate outbound network requests to the Telegram API domain.
  • Evidence: Network requests to https://api.telegram.org using the requests library.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 14, 2026, 02:12 PM