todo-tracker

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🔴 VERDICT: CRITICAL

This skill contains a critical command injection vulnerability in its todo.sh script, allowing arbitrary shell command execution via user-supplied input. Additionally, it instructs users to clone a repository from an untrusted GitHub organization, posing a supply chain risk.

Total Findings: 2

🔴 CRITICAL Findings: • Command Injection via sed

• scripts/todo.sh:102, 120 The mark_done and remove_item functions in scripts/todo.sh use sed commands where the user-supplied $pattern argument is directly embedded within double quotes in the sed regex. For example, sed -i '' "/\- \[ \].*$pattern/d" "$TODO_FILE". If $pattern contains shell command substitutions like $(command), these commands will be executed by the shell before sed even processes the string. This allows an attacker to execute arbitrary shell commands on the system where the skill is running.

🟡 MEDIUM Findings: • Unverifiable Dependency

• README.md:7 The installation instructions recommend cloning a Git repository (https://github.com/jdrhyne/todo-tracker-skill.git) from the jdrhyne GitHub organization. This organization is not listed as a trusted external source. Relying on code from unverified external sources introduces a supply chain risk, as the content of the repository could change or be malicious.

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