universal-notify

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 2, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/notify.sh is vulnerable to parameter and payload injection.
  • In the webhook channel, JSON is constructed using printf with direct variable interpolation: JSON=$(printf '{"title":"%s","message":"%s","priority":"%s"}' "${TITLE:-Notification}" "$MESSAGE" "$PRIORITY"). If the message contains double quotes or other JSON-sensitive characters, it can corrupt the payload or inject additional JSON fields.
  • In the telegram channel, data is sent via curl -d "text=${MESSAGE}". If the message contains an ampersand (&), it will be interpreted as an additional POST parameter rather than literal text.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The script allows sending data to arbitrary external URLs through the webhook, gotify, and ntfy (via --server) channels. If an attacker can influence the configuration of these channels, they could redirect sensitive notification content to an attacker-controlled server.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface (Category 8).
  • Ingestion points: The script scripts/notify.sh ingests untrusted data via the --message and --title command-line arguments.
  • Boundary markers: No boundary markers or delimiters are used to isolate user-provided content from the rest of the notification logic.
  • Capability inventory: The script has the capability to perform network operations (curl) to arbitrary URLs defined by the user.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or validation is performed on the input variables before they are interpolated into network request bodies.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 2, 2026, 08:39 PM