universal-notify
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/notify.shis vulnerable to parameter and payload injection. - In the
webhookchannel, JSON is constructed usingprintfwith direct variable interpolation:JSON=$(printf '{"title":"%s","message":"%s","priority":"%s"}' "${TITLE:-Notification}" "$MESSAGE" "$PRIORITY"). If the message contains double quotes or other JSON-sensitive characters, it can corrupt the payload or inject additional JSON fields. - In the
telegramchannel, data is sent viacurl -d "text=${MESSAGE}". If the message contains an ampersand (&), it will be interpreted as an additional POST parameter rather than literal text. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The script allows sending data to arbitrary external URLs through the
webhook,gotify, andntfy(via--server) channels. If an attacker can influence the configuration of these channels, they could redirect sensitive notification content to an attacker-controlled server. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface (Category 8).
- Ingestion points: The script
scripts/notify.shingests untrusted data via the--messageand--titlecommand-line arguments. - Boundary markers: No boundary markers or delimiters are used to isolate user-provided content from the rest of the notification logic.
- Capability inventory: The script has the capability to perform network operations (
curl) to arbitrary URLs defined by the user. - Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or validation is performed on the input variables before they are interpolated into network request bodies.
Audit Metadata