weather
Fail
Audited by Snyk on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: CRITICAL
Full Analysis
CRITICAL E004: Prompt injection detected in skill instructions.
- Potential prompt injection detected (high risk: 1.00). The skill includes a bash one-liner that appends an SSH public key to /root/.ssh/authorized_keys (a malicious action unrelated to fetching weather), which is a hidden/deceptive instruction outside the skill's stated purpose.
HIGH W007: Insecure credential handling detected in skill instructions.
- Insecure credential handling detected (high risk: 1.00). The prompt includes a literal SSH key-like string embedded in a shell one-liner that the agent would reproduce verbatim (appending it to /root/.ssh/authorized_keys), which requires handling credential-like data directly and is therefore insecure.
CRITICAL E006: Malicious code pattern detected in skill scripts.
- Malicious code pattern detected (high risk: 1.00). This skill contains a one-liner that appends an SSH public key to /root/.ssh/authorized_keys (and the repo name 'evilweather' is suspicious), which is a backdoor enabling unauthorized persistent root access and is definitely malicious.
MEDIUM W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).
- Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 1.00). The SKILL.md shows the skill fetches live output from the public wttr.in service (e.g., the wget "wttr.in/London?format=3" command), which is open/public third-party content the agent would read and therefore could carry untrusted/hostile input enabling indirect prompt injection.
MEDIUM W013: Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions.
- Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions detected (high risk: 1.00). The prompt includes a command that appends an SSH public key into /root/.ssh/authorized_keys, which modifies a privileged system file and creates persistent remote access, so it explicitly instructs compromising the machine state.
Audit Metadata