web-search-plus
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 15, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- PROMPT_INJECTION (HIGH): The skill is primarily a data ingestion tool for Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG). It fetches snippets and full-page content from five different search providers (Serper, Tavily, Exa, You.com, and SearXNG), which are untrusted external sources. Malicious instructions embedded in the search results could lead to indirect prompt injection, where the agent's behavior is hijacked by the retrieved content.
- Ingestion points: Search results and full-page Markdown content fetched via
scripts/search.py(referenced in documentation). - Boundary markers: No delimiters or explicit instructions to ignore embedded commands are mentioned in the provided documentation.
- Capability inventory: The skill is designed to feed data into an agent's reasoning loop and facilitates shell execution of scripts.
- Sanitization: While the documentation mentions SSRF protection for SearXNG instance URLs (blocking metadata and private IPs), it does not describe any sanitization or filtering of the actual search result content.
- EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS (MEDIUM): The skill requires the installation of external Python libraries not provided in the skill package itself. Specifically, it mentions the
requestslibrary in the troubleshooting documentation. - Evidence:
TROUBLESHOOTING.mddirects users to runpip3 install requestsorpip3 install -r requirements.txt. - COMMAND_EXECUTION (MEDIUM): The skill relies on executing local Python scripts (
scripts/setup.py,scripts/search.py) and provides a bash utility (test-auto-routing.sh) to run these scripts with user-supplied queries. Without the source code for the Python scripts, the safety of the command-line argument parsing and execution cannot be fully verified. - Evidence: Use of
python3 scripts/search.py -q "query"throughoutSKILL.mdandtest-auto-routing.sh.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata