xint
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 25, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The README and
install.shfiles promote a high-risk installation pattern where a remote shell script is downloaded and piped directly into bash (curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/0xNyk/xint/main/install.sh | bash). - The script originates from a personal GitHub repository (
0xNyk) which is not identified as a trusted organization or well-known service. - The installation process subsequently triggers unpinned dependency installation via
bun installat runtime. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by ingesting untrusted tweet data from X and processing it via the Grok AI model for sentiment analysis and reporting.
- Ingestion points:
lib/api.ts(tweet search and profile results). - Boundary markers: Present in
lib/sentiment.tsusing a bracketed ID and username format ([id] @username: text). - Capability inventory: The skill possesses network read capabilities and subprocess execution via
Bun.spawn. - Sanitization: Basic ANSI escape sequence removal is performed in
lib/tui.tsbefore display. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The TUI (Terminal User Interface) implementation in
lib/tui.tsutilizesBun.spawnto execute CLI subcommands. - These commands are dynamically constructed in
lib/tui_adapter.tsbased on user input and history categories. - [SAFE]: Sensitive credentials such as
X_BEARER_TOKENandXAI_API_KEYare managed through environment variables or local.envfiles. OAuth tokens are stored indata/oauth-tokens.jsonwith restrictive permissions (chmod 600). Webhook functionality includes protocol validation inlib/webhook-security.tsto ensure remote endpoints use HTTPS.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/0xNyk/xint/main/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata