openindex-cli

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill allows an agent to read messages from untrusted external sources, creating a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection. \n
  • Ingestion points: The get-messages and search commands retrieve untrusted content from the OpenIndex server.\n
  • Boundary markers: There are no instructions for the agent to treat message content as data rather than instructions.\n
  • Capability inventory: The skill provides commands for send-eth and send-token on multiple chains, allowing an attacker to potentially exfiltrate funds via injected instructions.\n
  • Sanitization: No sanitization of message content or user descriptions is mentioned.\n- Unverifiable Dependencies (MEDIUM): The installation instructions require downloading @openindex/openindexcli from npm. This package is not from a trusted organization listed in the security policy, posing a supply chain risk. \n- Data Exposure & Exfiltration (HIGH): The skill manages raw private keys through environment variables (OPENINDEX_PRIVATE_KEY) and CLI output. The create command prints a new private key directly to stdout, which is likely to be captured in the agent's persistent logs or memory context, violating credential safety best practices.\n- Command Execution (LOW): The skill relies on executing shell commands with user-provided arguments (usernames, messages, amounts), which could lead to local command injection if the agent does not properly escape these values.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 12:56 PM