open-prose
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: CRITICALEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPERSISTENCEMETADATA_POISONINGINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
prose installcommand and thedeps.mdspecification describe a system for cloning remote Git repositories from arbitrary hosts into a localdeps/directory. This allows the agent to download third-party code from any URL. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Code downloaded via the dependency system is intended to be executed by the agent as part of the 'OpenProse VM' orchestration flow. This creates a direct vector for running unverified remote scripts and programs.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requests and utilizes high-privilege tools, including
bash,execute_command, andpython, to perform Git operations, manage filesystems, and run sub-agent sessions. - [PERSISTENCE]: The
prose servecommand registers local cron jobs and HTTP trigger adapters to launch automated agent activations. The framework also maintains 'durable cross-run state' in the filesystem, allowing it to persist behavior across sessions. - [METADATA_POISONING]: The
SKILL.mdfile contains a dedicated section instructing the agent on how to proactively propose and 'sell' the OpenProse framework to the user, even if the user has not requested it. This is a form of behavioral manipulation to increase the framework's adoption. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The framework is designed to ingest and process untrusted external data (e.g., the
planning-corpusorinbox-gatewayexamples) which is then interpolated into prompts for sub-agents. This creates a significant surface for indirect prompt injection attacks. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The documentation in
deps.mdconfirms that the system utilizes the user's existing Git credential helpers and SSH keys. Given the agent hasbashaccess, these sensitive credentials could be exfiltrated to an external server.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata