planning-with-files-zh
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes automated hooks to trigger script execution within the environment. The
PreToolUsehook executes acatcommand on every tool call, and theStophook runs external scripts (check-complete.ps1orcheck-complete.sh) to verify task completion. These scripts use PowerShell execution policy bypasses or standard shell execution to perform their checks. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill architecture creates a significant surface for Indirect Prompt Injection. The
PreToolUsehook automatically reads and injects the first 30 lines oftask_plan.mdinto the agent's context whenever a tool is used. If malicious instructions from an external source (such as an adversarial web page) are written to the plan, they will be repeatedly processed as instructions by the agent. - Ingestion points: Content from
task_plan.mdis automatically read into the context via thePreToolUsehook defined inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: While the
SKILL.mdfile includes a "Security Boundary" section advising the agent to treat external content as untrusted, there are no technical delimiters used to wrap the injected file content to isolate it from the system prompt. - Capability inventory: The skill grants access to powerful tools including
Bash,Write, andEdit, which increases the potential impact of a successful injection. - Sanitization: No technical sanitization or validation of the content within the planning files is performed before it is injected into the context.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
session-catchup.pyscript is designed to access sensitive user data by reading session history logs. It resolves and parses JSONL files stored in the user's home directory (under~/.claude/projects/or~/.codex/sessions) to summarize previous interactions. Accessing these private files exposes the user's conversation history to the agent context.
Audit Metadata