plugin-creator
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill takes an untrusted description from the user and writes it directly into
plugin.json,README.md, andmarketplace.json.\n - Ingestion points: The CLI argument passed to
create-plugin.tsinscripts/create-plugin.ts.\n - Boundary markers: Absent. The user input is interpolated directly into file templates.\n
- Capability inventory:
writeFileSync(file modification),mkdirSync(directory creation), andBash(tsx:*)(command execution).\n - Sanitization: The
pluginNameis sanitized using a regex/[^a-z0-9-]/g, but thedescriptionitself is written verbatim into the files. A malicious description containing markdown headers or instructions (e.g., 'Ignore previous instructions') could compromise the agent if these files are later read as context.\n- Command Execution (HIGH): TheSKILL.mdinstructions recommend executing a Bash command:tsx create-plugin.ts "<description>".\n - If the agent interpolates the description without escaping, a user can provide a value like
\"; touch pwned; #\"to execute arbitrary shell commands. While the script's internal logic sanitizes for file paths, it cannot protect against injection occurring at the shell invocation layer.\n- Persistence Mechanisms (LOW): The script modifiesmarketplace.json, which acts as a local registry for plugins. While intended for scaffolding, this allows persistent modification of the agent's environment state.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata