venue-templates
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- COMMAND_EXECUTION (LOW): The script
validate_format.pyinvokes external binariespdfinfoandpdffontsviasubprocess.run. Evidence:subprocess.run(['pdfinfo', str(pdf_path)], ...)andsubprocess.run(['pdffonts', str(pdf_path)], ...)inscripts/validate_format.py. While implemented safely using argument lists to prevent shell injection, it relies on the presence and security of host-installed tools. - PROMPT_INJECTION (LOW): The script
customize_template.pyperforms unsanitized interpolation of user input into LaTeX templates, representing an indirect prompt injection surface. Evidence Chain: - Ingestion points: Command-line arguments (
--title,--authors, etc.) and interactiveinput()prompts inscripts/customize_template.py. - Boundary markers: Absent; placeholders are substituted directly into the LaTeX source code.
- Capability inventory: File-write operations to create new
.texfiles; subsequent use involves LaTeX compilation which may haveshell-escapecapabilities. - Sanitization: Absent; no escaping of LaTeX-sensitive control sequences (e.g.,
\write18) is performed on user input.
Audit Metadata