workflow-router
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 15, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION] (HIGH): Indirect Prompt Injection vulnerability surface. The skill acts as an orchestrator that takes user-provided goals and descriptions and injects them into sub-agent prompts.
- Ingestion points: Variables like
[topic],[feature/task],[task], and[issue description]in theAgent Spawn Examplessection ofSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill uses simple string templates (e.g.,
Implement: [task]) without XML tags, delimiters, or 'ignore instructions' warnings. - Capability inventory: The skill spawns the
krakenagent (Build goal), which is described as an 'Implementation agent' that 'handles coding tasks'. This constitutes a high-privilege write/execute capability. - Sanitization: Absent. There is no evidence of input validation or escaping before the data is passed to sub-agents.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): The skill uses the shell command
ls thoughts/shared/plans/*.md 2>/dev/nullin Step 2 to detect existing files. While the path is hardcoded, the use of raw shell commands increases the attack surface if logic were to become more dynamic.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata