skills/pedronauck/skills/pptx-creator/Gen Agent Trust Hub

pptx-creator

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 18, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted Markdown and JSON data to generate presentation content, making it susceptible to indirect injection attacks.
  • Ingestion points: Input files provided via the --outline and --json flags in scripts/create_pptx.py and scripts/use_template.py.
  • Boundary markers: No boundary markers or delimiters are used to isolate untrusted data from the instructions.
  • Capability inventory: Includes file system access (reading images/data, writing PPTX files), network access (via httpx), and subprocess execution (uv run).
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the input text before it is inserted into slides or passed to downstream scripts.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/create_pptx.py executes local subprocesses with arguments derived from user input.
  • Evidence: The generate_image function uses subprocess.run to call a script from another skill (nano-banana-pro). It passes a prompt extracted directly from the user's markdown or JSON content. While it avoids using a shell, it presents a surface for argument injection or prompt injection targeting the image generator.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill can be coerced into attempting to read local files via path manipulation.
  • Evidence: The markdown parser in scripts/create_pptx.py accepts file paths in the image syntax ![alt](path). If an attacker provides a path to a sensitive file (e.g., /etc/passwd), the script will attempt to read it using Path.exists() and Presentation.add_picture(). Although python-pptx would likely fail to process non-image files, this capability could be used for file existence checks or to trigger errors exposing system information.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 18, 2026, 01:53 AM