research-gather

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION] (HIGH): The skill explicitly instructs the agent to read from a private vault (~/src/eterne/vault/) containing sensitive biographical data.
  • Evidence: Documentation states the vault includes names, health history, location, and family/relationship context.
  • Risk: If the agent is compromised via indirect injection, this highly sensitive data could be exfiltrated.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): The skill uses shell commands for research gathering.
  • Evidence: Uses git log and gh pr list with user-supplied or data-derived keywords.
  • Risk: Potential for command injection if keywords are not properly sanitized before being passed to the shell.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION] (HIGH): High risk of Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8) due to the processing of external content.
  • Ingestion Points: GitHub PRs, issues, commits, session transcripts, and external web searches.
  • Capability Inventory: File system write access (pipeline/active/), and command execution (git, gh).
  • Boundary Markers: Absent. There are no instructions to ignore embedded commands in the source material.
  • Sanitization: Absent. The skill extracts code and excerpts directly into the research documents.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE] (LOW): While not hardcoding API keys, it relies on the presence of pre-authenticated environments for gh and git which could be abused if the agent is misled.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 05:32 AM