agent-changelog

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): The skill possesses a significant attack surface by ingesting data from untrusted or attacker-controllable sources, specifically git log output, code comments, and project documentation.
  • Ingestion Points: git log (commit messages), .claude/plans/, docs/, and source code comments.
  • Boundary Markers: None. The skill does not implement delimiters or 'ignore' instructions for the data it processes.
  • Capability Inventory: The skill has file-write capabilities (AGENT_CHANGELOG.md) and command execution capabilities (git).
  • Sanitization: None. Malicious content in a commit message (e.g., from a PR) or a documentation file could be verbatim interpolated into the final changelog. Because the AGENT_CHANGELOG.md is intended to be an 'authoritative' guide for future agents, this creates a persistent injection that can subvert future agent reasoning.
  • [Command Execution] (LOW): The skill executes shell commands (git log, git tag). These are standard operations for the stated purpose but should be monitored for command injection if variables were ever introduced into the shell strings.
  • [Data Exposure] (LOW): The skill consolidates project trajectory, architectural decisions, and 'Stale Information' into a single file. While intended, this aggregates sensitive internal project knowledge into a structured format that could be easily exfiltrated by other compromised skills.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 02:16 AM