openclaw-customizer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [Indirect Prompt Injection] (LOW): The skill instructions in
SKILL.mddirect the agent to fetch live data fromhttps://docs.openclaw.ai/llms.txtfor any information not found in the local reference files. This creates a surface where compromised external documentation could influence the agent's behavior. - Ingestion points:
SKILL.md(External fetch fromdocs.openclaw.ai). - Boundary markers: Absent; there are no instructions to sanitize or delimit the content fetched from the web.
- Capability inventory: The skill documents access to powerful tools including
exec,write, and theopenclawCLI. - Sanitization: Absent.
- [Unverifiable Dependencies & Remote Code Execution] (MEDIUM): The documentation in
references/tools-skills-hooks.mdpromotes the use ofclawhub, a command-line utility for installing community-created skills. This pattern encourages the execution of unverified remote code on the user's infrastructure. - [Command Execution] (LOW): Multiple reference files provide specific shell command patterns for the
openclawCLI, includingcronjob creation and system configuration. While these are legitimate features of the software, they represent a significant capability surface that could be abused if the agent is subjected to prompt injection.
Audit Metadata