videoagent-video-studio
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied text prompts and image URLs which are passed to external AI video generation models.
- Ingestion points: The
--promptand--image-urlarguments intools/generate.jsaccept arbitrary external data. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions to the model to ignore embedded commands within the user prompt.
- Capability inventory: The
tools/generate.jsscript performs network operations (fetch) to send data to the proxy, and the proxy interacts with several external AI model providers (MiniMax, Kling, Google Veo, Grok, etc.). - Sanitization: Input strings are only subjected to basic whitespace trimming (
.trim()) before being sent to the AI backends. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: By default, the
tools/generate.jsutility transmits user prompts and image URLs to a hosted proxy service (video-gen-proxy.vercel.app). While this is the intended functionality for a zero-setup experience, users should be aware that their content is processed by this external endpoint unless they choose to deploy their own instance of the provided proxy code. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses a Node.js script (
tools/generate.js) as the primary interface for the agent. This script handles command-line arguments and performs network requests. This is standard for utility-based skills but requires the agent to have execution permissions for the script. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The proxy implementation uses environment variables for secret management, which is a secure practice. However, the statistics dashboard endpoint (
/api/stats) is protected by an optionalSTATS_KEY. If a user deploys this proxy without setting theSTATS_KEY, usage metadata including generation counts and model preferences would be publicly accessible via the/api/stats?ui=1interface.
Audit Metadata