architect
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from GitHub, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads external data via
gh issue view $1 --commentsinSKILL.mdto gather context for architectural design. - Boundary markers: Content retrieved from GitHub is passed to tools like
codexandgeminiwithout explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands. - Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to modify GitHub issues (
gh issue comment,gh issue edit), write to the local filesystem (~/.agent/diagrams/), and execute theopencommand. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the ingested issue comments is performed before processing.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Several shell commands are constructed using variables that could potentially contain unsanitized input.
- Evidence: The
$1argument (Issue ID) is used directly inghcommands without shell quoting. Additionally, the{feature}variable used in theopencommand for visual deliverables could lead to command injection if the feature name contains shell metacharacters such as pipes or semicolons.
Audit Metadata