architect

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 23, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from GitHub, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: The skill reads external data via gh issue view $1 --comments in SKILL.md to gather context for architectural design.
  • Boundary markers: Content retrieved from GitHub is passed to tools like codex and gemini without explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to modify GitHub issues (gh issue comment, gh issue edit), write to the local filesystem (~/.agent/diagrams/), and execute the open command.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the ingested issue comments is performed before processing.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Several shell commands are constructed using variables that could potentially contain unsanitized input.
  • Evidence: The $1 argument (Issue ID) is used directly in gh commands without shell quoting. Additionally, the {feature} variable used in the open command for visual deliverables could lead to command injection if the feature name contains shell metacharacters such as pipes or semicolons.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Feb 23, 2026, 09:42 PM