cartographer

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill maps codebases by reading all files, making it highly vulnerable to instructions hidden within the source code of the project being analyzed.
  • Ingestion points: Sonnet subagents read all files in the target directory (Step 4).
  • Boundary markers: No boundary markers or 'ignore' instructions are present in the subagent prompt template to prevent the AI from obeying instructions found inside the scanned files.
  • Capability inventory: The skill modifies local files (docs/CODEBASE_MAP.md and CLAUDE.md) and can execute shell commands (pip, git, python3).
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation logic is defined for the content extracted from the codebase before it is used to generate documentation or influence agent decisions.
  • Command Execution (MEDIUM): The skill executes a script located at ~/.claude/skills/cartographer/scripts/scan-codebase.py. This script's logic is opaque and resides in a local path that could be subject to tampering or unexpected behavior.
  • External Downloads (MEDIUM): The skill prompts the agent to perform runtime package installations (pip install tiktoken). While tiktoken is a common library, runtime installations from within an agent skill can be exploited if the package name is targeted or if the environment is not properly isolated.
  • Metadata Poisoning (LOW): The skill references an untrusted external repository (https://github.com/kingbootoshi/cartographer) which is not on the trusted sources list. This may lead users to download additional unverified content.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 08:15 PM