cli-reference
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (HIGH): The skill provides the agent with specific command recipes for high-impact infrastructure operations. These commands allow for direct modification of production environments with no human-in-the-loop validation.
- Evidence: Templates for
gh pr merge --squash,vercel env add KEY production, andstripe -p production products create. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION] (MEDIUM): The skill includes commands designed to extract sensitive configuration data and write to local environment files, exposing them to the agent context.
- Evidence:
vercel env ls | grep productionlists production secrets, andecho '...' >> .env.localmodifies sensitive local configuration files. - [PROMPT_INJECTION] (HIGH): The skill establishes an indirect prompt injection surface by bridging untrusted data (like PR descriptions or env values) to powerful CLI tools.
- Ingestion points: The
valuein environment variable templates andtitle/bodyin GitHub CLI commands. - Boundary markers: Absent. No delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are provided.
- Capability inventory: Subprocess execution of
gh,vercel,stripe,sentry-cli,npx, andcurl. - Sanitization: Absent. The templates use
printfor quotes which do not prevent high-level instruction injection in the processed text. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (LOW): The skill relies on
npxfor executing certain tools, which involves runtime package acquisition from external registries. - Evidence:
npx convex env setdownloads and executes theconvexpackage at runtime.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata