fix-observability

[Skill Scanner] Installation of third-party script detected All findings: [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [HIGH] data_exfiltration: Credential file access detected (DE002) [AITech 8.2.3] This skill is coherent with its stated purpose of fixing observability gaps (Sentry, health endpoint, logging, PostHog). There are no explicit malicious code samples in the provided content. However, it instructs executing remotely-downloaded code (npx @sentry/wizard@latest, pnpm installs) and running opaque local scripts under ~/.claude/skills/..., which are supply-chain and local-execution risk vectors. Treat any invoked scripts and runtime package installs as untrusted until inspected. Recommendations: inspect the referenced ~/.claude scripts before running, pin npx/package versions or review the wizard output, limit SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN scope, and avoid committing secrets into repository files. Overall: likely benign workflow but with notable supply-chain/execution risks that warrant caution. LLM verification: This skill's purpose (fixing observability issues) aligns with the capabilities it instructs. There is no explicit malicious code in the provided text. However several supply-chain and privacy risks are present: unpinned npm installs and npx usage (can pull arbitrary upstream code), and references to running local scripts in ~/.claude/skills which are outside the reviewed repository and could execute arbitrary commands. The skill also instructs storing and using telemetry credentials and onboard