review-branch
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 27, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a shell command using
openon a file path that includes the{branch}name. If a git branch is maliciously named with shell metacharacters (e.g.,;,&, or backticks), it could lead to arbitrary command execution when the agent attempts to open the visual deliverable. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted input in the form of
git diffoutput and passes it directly to multiple AI reviewer personas. This creates a surface where an attacker can embed malicious instructions in code comments or strings to manipulate the review or the agent's behavior. - Ingestion points: The
git diffoutput is used as the primary input for all reviewer agents defined inreferences/reviewer-prompts.md. - Boundary markers: The templates use headers like
[DIFF]but do not provide explicit instructions to the AI agents to ignore or sanitize embedded instructions within that content. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to execute shell commands (
git,open) and read/write to the filesystem (e.g.,~/.agent/diagrams/), which could be abused if an injection is successful. - Sanitization: No sanitization is performed on the branch name or the diff content before they are used in shell commands or prompt templates.
Audit Metadata