connect
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- Unverifiable Dependencies (MEDIUM): The skill performs a global installation of
@picahq/clivia npm. This source is not included in the predefined trusted organizations list, making it an unverifiable dependency. - Persistence Mechanisms & Sensitive File Access (HIGH): The
pica initcommand modifies sensitive AI agent configuration files, including~/.claude.json,~/.cursor/mcp.json, and~/Library/Application Support/Claude/claude_desktop_config.json. This acts as a persistence mechanism that ensures the Pica MCP server is loaded automatically in future sessions and provides the ability to read/write existing configurations. - Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): This skill provides the capability to ingest data from 200+ external platforms and execute actions on them.
- Ingestion points: External data enters the agent context through platform-specific actions via the
execute_pica_actiontool (e.g., reading emails or Slack messages). - Boundary markers: The skill fails to define any boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the ingested data.
- Capability inventory: The skill provides high-privilege capabilities, including the ability to execute API actions (write/execute) on connected platforms.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or content filtering for data retrieved from external platforms.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata