docx
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 5, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The module
scripts/office/soffice.pycontains a hardcoded C source string (_SHIM_SOURCE) that is written to a temporary file, compiled at runtime into a shared object usinggcc, and then injected into thesoffice(LibreOffice) subprocess via theLD_PRELOADenvironment variable. This constitutes dynamic code generation and process injection. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill frequently executes system commands via subprocesses, specifically invoking
gccfor shim compilation,sofficefor document processing and conversions,pandocfor markdown text extraction, andpdftoppmfor image generation. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
SKILL.mdfile directs the AI agent to install thedocxpackage from the global npm registry (npm install -g docx). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a susceptibility surface for indirect prompt injection due to its handling of untrusted Word document content. 1. Ingestion points: Untrusted document data enters the agent context through parsing via
pandocorunpack.py. 2. Boundary markers: The extracted text is not isolated with delimiters or specific ignore-instructions. 3. Capability inventory: The skill has extensive system permissions, including subprocess execution and file system write capabilities. 4. Sanitization: The skill implementsdefusedxmlfor XML parsing, which effectively mitigates XML External Entity (XXE) and billion laughs attacks.
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