rag-systems
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface where untrusted data from documents could influence the agent's behavior. \n
- Ingestion points: External data enters the system through
PyPDFLoaderinSKILL.mdand theingestmethod inscripts/rag_pipeline.py. \n - Boundary markers: Prompt templates in
scripts/rag_pipeline.py(lines 399-408) use text-based labels like 'Context:' and 'Question:', which provide weak separation between instructions and untrusted data. \n - Capability inventory: The
RAGPipelineclass inscripts/rag_pipeline.pyperforms retrieval and generation tasks but does not contain dangerous capabilities such as subprocess execution, file writing, or network requests to unknown domains. \n - Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering is performed on the retrieved document chunks before they are interpolated into the final prompt sent to the LLM.
Audit Metadata