skills/popodidi/harvis/lark/Gen Agent Trust Hub

lark

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 12, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The retry_with_backoff function in scripts/lark-auth.sh uses eval "$cmd" to execute shell commands. This pattern can be dangerous if the command string is influenced by untrusted input.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external content from Lark documents via the /lark read command, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection. Maliciously crafted documents could attempt to influence the agent's behavior.
  • Ingestion points: Document content is fetched from the Lark API via the get_all_document_blocks function in scripts/lark-auth.sh.
  • Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are added to the parsed document content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities to edit documents (update_block), send messages (mcp__tn-lark__im_v1_message_create), and search for users.
  • Sanitization: Content retrieved from the API is converted to markdown but is not sanitized to remove or neutralize potential prompt injection attacks.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill communicates with Lark's official API endpoints (open.larksuite.com) to manage authentication and document data.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Authentication tokens are cached in the /tmp/claude/lark/lark-token.cache file. Storing sensitive access tokens in a shared temporary directory can lead to unintended exposure.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 12, 2026, 11:41 PM