posthog-inbound-leads

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted input from sales leads, such as Salesforce fields and email bodies, without sufficient boundaries or sanitization.
  • Ingestion points: Lead context and messages are ingested in the first step of the core workflow in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: The skill does not use explicit boundary markers or instructions to disregard potential commands embedded within the lead data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill uses vitally:search_users and vitally:get_account_full to retrieve sensitive customer data (including MRR and health scores) and uses web_search and web_fetch for external connectivity.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering of the lead-provided text is performed before it influences the agent's logic or is used in email drafting.
  • Risk: A malicious lead could contain instructions designed to trick the agent into qualifying a lead, disclosing sensitive Vitally data, or exfiltrating information via the automated URL validation step (Step 5 in SKILL.md) that fetches all links in the generated draft email.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 16, 2026, 12:47 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — posthog-inbound-leads